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from a costly civil war, which plagued the state for over a quarter century. 4 The problems of sub-Saharan Africa may seem distant and non-pressing to the United States (U.S.), especially with two ongoing wars in the Middle East. However, according to the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), "Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance,"
History has shown time after time that chances of conflict expansion are high in Africa.
5 and the U.S. aims "to promote economic development and the expansion of 
Thesis: Strengthen Ties with Zambia and Increase Regional Interagency Efforts
These important and complex tasks need an overarching strategy to ensure all efforts are effective and focused.
Protecting and strengthening development in Africa's states in pursuit of U.S. strategic goals is a massive endeavor. In order to meet these goals as outlined in the 2006 NSS, the U.S. must prioritize and concentrate efforts. Due to the massive scope of Africa and its indigenous problems, this paper offers an overarching strategy for only the southern half of the continent.
This suggested strategy involves the region south of the Central African Republic, and excluding the Horn of Africa (HOA). This southern area needs additional emphasis, because its strategic importance has been obscured by the Islamic extremist threat in the north and east areas of the continent.
For the purposes of this paper, development refers to the advancement of social and economic quality of life. This quality should apply to a large majority of a state's population instead of just for an elite few. Stability refers to a government's ability to effectively control its people and provide for essential needs (i.e. food, water, law, etc. 14 Using ethnic hatred to rally support for their regime, the Rwandan Hutu leaders ultimately would start a genocidal campaign against the Tutsi in the early 1990s. 15 The crisis escalated when several prominent Hutu were killed in 1993-1994. 16 For weeks, mass killings of 21 Despite the change of regimes, violence in the DRC continued.
Rwandan President Kagame became disillusioned with the new DRC leader, and organized another insurgency against him. Again, other regional players meddled, including Angola and Zimbabwe. 22 The DRC was now mired in a complex civil war, with multiple insurgent groups sponsored by regional powerbrokers looting the countryside of natural resources. 23 In 2002, the death toll from four years of prolonged fighting had reached over three million. 24 Although all foreign state militaries left the nation when peace accords were signed in July 2002, proxy insurgent groups continued fighting in the eastern provinces. In fact, there are dozens of these groups, despite the presence of over 17,000 U.N. peacekeepers. 25 While the DRC suffered through a prolonged civil war, Zimbabwe's population dealt with the corrupt authoritarian regime of Robert Mugabe. Mugabe became the first president of the newly independent state in 1980. 26 He intimidated political opponents and rigged several elections over the years, and his reign persists today. 27 The dangers of Mugabe's leadership are evident in his background before the presidency.
His skill at coordinating insurgencies was seen in the years leading up to Zimbabwean 33 Mugabe's authoritarian personality likely makes this agreement a mirage. Zimbabwe currently has the highest inflation rate in the world, and the government faces riots from a cholera epidemic and inability to pay its military personnel. 34 While political turmoil exists in several areas in southern Africa, an even more pervasive threat exists throughout the area -Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Sub-Saharan
Africa accounts for two thirds of the HIV-infected people in the world. 35 The epicenter of this disease is in the heart of southern Africa. Seven states in this area contain HIV infection rates higher than 15%. These states include Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 36 This high infection percentage dramatically increases mortality rates while significantly decreasing life expectancy and birth rates in this region; these HIV impacts seriously jeopardize economic development for many future generations. 37 As two looming political crises and an AIDS epidemic threaten southern Africa, another situation promises to exacerbate conflict if conditions deteriorate. Angola, located on the southeast coast of the African continent, emerged from a twenty-seven year civil war in 2002. 38 This deadly conflict escalated into a proxy war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1980s, as Jonas Savimbi's Unita insurgency was supported by the West and the Marxist regime was supported by the Soviets. 39 Yet the end of the Cold War did not stop the conflict in Angola;
Savimbi's insurgency developed into a regional conflict that lasted until after the turn of the century.
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Zambia -the "Strategic Heart"
41
Zambia is the ideal state to concentrate U.S. assistance for several reasons: the state strategically borders recent and current crisis hot spots; its government is stable and friendly to the U.S.; the government's regional focus is compatible with U.S. interests; and its leaders can make the most improvement to its people's economic and social development with the U.S.' concentrated effort. While other states in the region would benefit from a priority partnership with the U.S., Zambia has the best mix of need for assistance and ability to influence the region. This central location offers easy access to all of southern Africa's most likely areas to have reinvigorated political violence and humanitarian crises. Furthermore, improving Zambia's ability to respond to these issues would better insure a geographic buffer exists between any two potential crises (e.g. buffer between ethnic violence in the DRC and governmental collapse in Zimbabwe); this could significantly reduce the spread of isolated conflicts to regional disasters.
Its geographic importance is evident in the amount of refugees its government hosts from other African states; as of January 2009, Zambia shelters 87,000 refugees, mainly originating from Angola and the DRC. 44 A key enabler to Zambia's strategic importance is the government's stability and dedication to democratic principles. This trend in Zambian stability was evident when President Kenneth Kaunda conceded defeat when he lost the election in October 1991 to the first multiparty opposition candidate. 45 In contrast to Mugabe's draconian tactics to hold onto power in Although Zambia ranked in the "hybrid regime" category, the state places well above regimes considered authoritarian (e.g. Zimbabwe and Angola). Yet, two positive traits of Zambia's stability is the government's willingness to acknowledge its internal flaws and the leaders' desire to improve its governance. Zambia's willingness to improve is evident from its completion of however, the government has shown limited and growing interest in establishing ties. This willingness to improve in the military arena, as well as in civil governance, makes Zambia an excellent candidate for partnership. 64 and are not themselves embroiled in heated political turmoil, they are not ideally located in central, southern Africa like Zambia is. Each only borders Zimbabwe, the DRC, or neither; this geographic reality makes these other states less ideal as a hub for regional operations. Zambia, for all of the aforementioned reasons, is the ideal candidate for a strategic partnership.
USAFRICOM role in Tackling Southern Africa's Potential Crises
The severe consequences of apathy or delayed reaction to crises were evident in the turmoil in the first few decades of the post-colonial era. Inaction of UN forces during the Rwandan Hutu massacres of Tutsis during the 1990s resulted in hundreds of thousands killed.
Individual state agendas led to pillaging, chaos, and disaster during the Angolan civil war which ended in 2002. Although significant political and economic progress has occurred in the last two decades in southern Africa, history may repeat itself unless significant precautions are taken to anticipate likely crises. Currently, a Zimbabwean collapse seems the most likely scenario.
Zimbabwe's economic ruin, combined with an egocentric president's ruthless tactics, could lead to a massive humanitarian crisis. Mugabe's actions in the past also show he is capable of invading other nations when it suits his purpose. For example, President Mugabe intervened with forces in the DRC to save the regime of Kabila in 1998 for no other reason than a power-play for influence in the region. 65 Southern African states must prepare thoroughly for this very possible situation. In order to ensure a Zimbabwean collapse is contained and a speedy recovery is in place, the US Department of State should discuss forming more substantive military partnerships with the Zambian leadership. Anti-colonial sentiment pervasive throughout Africa will likely limit any
In the case of a near-economic collapse, Mugabe may try to invade another nation in order to secure resources for his troops and supporters. A surge in refugees fleeing Zimbabwe is likely in any case.
large or permanent U.S. military presence in southern Africa, at least in the near to mid-term.
Therefore, any type of offer would have to ensure that the US military does not appear to infringe Zambian sovereignty.
Although the Department of State should lead the diplomatic efforts in southern Africa, USAFRICOM still can have an important role in protecting and strengthening development.
When dealing with the current crises in Zimbabwe, USAFRICOM can better enable Zambia to lead deterrent and containment efforts against Mugabe's brutal tactics. 
Conclusion
In the past two decades, central and southern Africans witnessed numerous improvements in stability and development. Many states in this region lost their first generation of powerhungry, egocentric leaders and gained growing, multi-party democracies. Even citizens of Angola and the DRC emerged from decades of bloody strife to sense hope for a better future.
However, amidst the signs of development, major threats loom. Most significantly, the political corruption and economic disaster in Zimbabwe threaten to disrupt the bordering states. Likewise
United Nations peacekeepers attempt to quell insurgents in the DRC and Angola from spreading ethnic rivalries throughout the region. Yet an even more pressing threat to continued development exists with indigenous diseases. The extremely-high HIV infection percentages in many sub-Saharan states may cripple economies in the future if aggressive prevention and mitigation methods are ignored.
Zambia lies in the midst of all these threats -a geographic "heart" of central and southern
Africa. It is this land-locked nation-state that offers the United States a potent strategic partner in dealing with these numerous obstacles to strong, sustained social and economic growth.
Due to anti-colonial sentiments US military assistance will not dominate interactions in southern Africa. Diplomacy will be the first and foremost instrument in protecting and strengthening development on southern Africa. However, the military instrument can and should serve a limited purpose in this region. The State Department, in conjunction with USAFRICOM civilians, should encourage Zambia to accept limited military assistance. This assistance would be low profile and targeted to deal with the potential threats to development. This assistance should help with protecting against political crises, of which a Zimbabwean collapse is most likely. FLINTLOCK exercises would prepare the African forces to work together and contain crises. The US could offer very limited military support through nearly invisible intelligencegathering and information operations air operations. These efforts, combined with significant diplomatic finesse, would protect the significant development the southern continent has seen in the last two decades and promote lasting development in the future. 
